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LIFE INSURANCE, THE FORBIDDEN FRUIT
WILLIAM J. BOWE*
Until recently life insurance has represented the most impenetrable
stronghold of the professional tax avoider and his advisors. As a vehicle for
the transmission of wealth to future generations with minimum tax levies, it
stood unrivaled. During a policyholder's life the value of his policy for gift
tax purposes was and is measured by replacement cost.' Under applicable
regulations during the thirties, when insurance was transferred by way of
inter vivos gift the tremendous increase in value of the policy that came with
death escaped gift tax, income tax, and estate tax.2 But since 1941 the situa-
tion has been reversed so that it may be fairly said from the standpoint of
tax avoidance that life insurance is now in the doghouse.
3
It is the object of this paper to trace the history of the impact of federal
taxation on life insurance and the efforts of the Treasury "to keep apace with
the fertility of invention" of taxpayers.4 It might as appropriately have been
entitled "A Study in the Consequence of Tax Avoidance." This is not to say
that tax avoidance is in any sense improper. The legal right of a taxpayer to
decrease the amount of what would otherwise be his taxes or altogether to
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U. S. 254, 61 Sup. Ct. 507, 85 L. Ed. 813 (1941).
2. The cost of a single premium policy in the face amount of $100,000 at age 40 is
$57,833. Thus an inter vivos gift of the policy resulted in the remaining $42,177 passing
free of gift, income, and estate taxes.
3. This may be shown by example. Thus a person who irrevocably transfers policies
to a trust, together with securities producing sufficient income to meet the annual charges,
incurs gift tax liability on the replacement value of the policies in addition to the value
of the securities. Commissioner v. Beck, 129 F. 2d 243 (C. C. A. 2d 1942). The income
used to pay the premiums will continue to be taxable' to him though permanently beyond
his control. INT. REV. CODE § 167(a) (3). On his death the proceeds of the contract will
be included irq his gross taxable estate. This conclusion is contra to tile often cited case
of Helvering v. Reybine, 83 F. 2d 215 (C. C. A. 2d 1936). But the 1942 amendments to
INT. REv. CODE § 81 1(g) were clearly intended to remove any lingering hope taxpayers
might have reposed in that decision. H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1942) ;
SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1942): "A decedent similarly pays the
premium or other consideration if payment is made by a corporation which is his alter
ego or by a trust whose income is taxable to him, as, for example, a funded insurance
trust." See PAUL, SUPPLEMENT TO FEDERAL ESTATE AND Giir TAXATION 363 (1946).
It is immaterial that the transfer was irrevocable, made many years before death and
there is no contention that it was made in contemplation of death.
To cite another example, a husband assigns his insurance contract to his wife, and
pays gift tax on its then value. Each time he pays a subsequent premium lie pays a
further gift tax or reduces the amount he otherwise could give her annually free of tax.
Their son is named beneficiary. On death the proceeds of the policy will be taxed as part
of his estate (with gift tax credit) and his wife will incur, simultaneously, gift tax liability
measured by the full amount of the identical proceeds-estate tax, INT. REV. CoDE §
811(g) (2) ; gift tax, Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F. 2d. 218 (C. C. A. 2d 1946). Nor
will the permissive splitting of gift tax liability under INT. REV. CODE § 1000(f) (1) (A)
ameliorate the double burden, since the completion of the gift does not precede the termi-
nation of the marital relationship.
4. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 676, 53 Sup. Ct. 761, 77 L. Ed. 1439 (1933).
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avoid them by means which the law permits, is hornbook law. He need not
adopt the most expensive tax method of procedure. Rather than sell securities
held for exactly six months and incur a tax on the whole profit, he may delay
the sale for one additional day and suffer income tax on only half of his
profits.5 Rather than pay a debt with a $20.00 check where a tax is imposed
on all checks of $20.00 or more, he may pay the same debt by drawing two
checks each in the amount of $10.00. 6 The difficulty with drawing a line, as
Mr. Justice Holmes has pointed out, is that the taxpayer may come as close to
the line as he will so long as he does not cross it3
But those who draw the lines-legislators, courts and administrators-
are free to re-draw them and when large numbers approach too closely to a
given line it is almost certain to -be moved. Since the placing of the line
initially resulted from the exercise of discretionary power, difficulties rarely
arise in enlarging the scope of a statute's coverage. Even constitutional limi-
tations may be stretched where a vital need exists. To prevent evasion Con-
gress may include within the sweep of a statute a status or an act not. normal-
ly within its reach. It may adopt measures reasonably calculated to prevent
avoidance of a tax. "A legislative declaration that a status of the taxpayer's
creation shall in the application of the tax be deemed to be the equivalent
of another status falling normally within the scope of the taxing power, if
reasonably requisite to prevent evasion, does not take property without due
process." 8
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CURRENT LAW
(1) The Statute
The only specific references to life insurance in the 1913 and 1916
Revenue Acts were provisions which granted exemption from income taxes.
The 1916 Act required as a condition of estate taxability that the property of
the decedent be subject to the payment of charges against his estate and .the ex-
penses of administration.' 0 Thus only proceeds of insurance payable to the
insured's executor or administrator were caught. Payments to beneficiaries
5. INT. REV. CODE § 117.
6. United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 21 L. Ed. 728 (U. S. 1873).
7. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, 395, 50 Sup. Ct. 169, 74 L. Ed.
504 (1930).
8. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 90, 56 Sup. Ct. 70,, 80
L. Ed. 62 (1935). Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270
U. S. 230, 241, 46 Sup. Ct. 260, 70 L. Ed. 557 (1926) (a case involving the constitution-
ality of a statute creating a conclusive presumption that all gifts made within six years
of the date of death were to be classed as made in contemplation of death), expressed
the thought graphically: "Of course many gifts will be hit by the tax that were made
with no contemplation of death. But the law allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes
beyond the outline of its object in order that the object may be secured."
9. 1913 Act g II, subd. 2B, 38 STAT. 167; 1916 Act § 4, 39 STAT. 758.
10. 1916 Act § 202(a), 39 SxAT. 777.
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were not included as part of the taxable estate. The easy road to avoidance was
too clear to pass unnoticed.
This led to prompt amendment. In the 1918 Act insurance was includible
as part of the gross estate "to the extent of the amount receivable by the exec-
utor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life;
and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all
other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon
his own life." 1 This provision continued without change until 1942.
The Ways and Means Committee Report in discussing reasons for the
legislative amendment stated with what in the light of later events seems un-
believable naivet6: "It has been brought to the attention of the Committee
that wealthy persons have and now anticipate resorting to this method of de-
feating the estate tax. Agents of insurance companies have openly urged
persons of wealth to take out additional insurance .. .for the reason that
insurance would not be included in the gross estate." 12
The limitation, "taken out by the decedent," cried at birth for clarification.
The need for administrative regulations and judicial construction was im-
mediately apparent. To give these words their literal meaning-i.e., applied
for and first premium paid by the decedent-would fly in the face of the
expressed Congressional policy of subjecting insurance proceeds to taxation
with other property transmitted at death. A moment's reflection by the legis-
lators would have satisfied them that the agents who openly urged the pur-
chase of insurance to avoid estate taxes would be ingenious enough now to
urge its purchase to accomplish the same objective by having some member of
the insured's family apply for and pay the initial premium.
The phrase, "taken out," permits of three possible constructions: (1) pur-
chased and owned by the decedent or, (2) owned by decedent (incidents-of-
ownership test) or (3) purchased by him (premium-payment test). The first
construction would appear to cover the normal situation. In the absence of
tax considerations, only in exceptional circumstances would the premiums be
paid by someone other than the owner. Also the insured would normally pur-
chase and continue to own the contract. The second construction would rely
upon ownership of a policy (without regard to the'source of the premium pay-
ments) as the test of taxability. The policy with its loan and cash surrender
values and power to designate and change beneficiaries, is property of sub-
stantial worth even prior to death. These rights ard as capable of valuable eco-
normic use as stocks, bonds and bank deposits. The third construction would
111. 1918 Act § 402(f), 40 STAT. 1098 (1919).
12. H. R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918). Compare this language
with the less restrained Committee Reports in 1942 (H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 162; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 235), dealing with insurance
amendments and referred to later in this article: "This provision is intended to prevent
avoidance of the estate tax and should be construed in accordance with this objective."
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fasten on the payment of premiums as the decisive factor. The argument that
Congress intended to reach the fund built up over the years by periodic pay-
ments by an insured and transmitted at his death to the natural objects of his
bounty would seem to be in accord with the general objective of any system
of succession taxation. The presence of the technical indicia of ownership in
an insured's donee in a case where the insurance contract has been assigned
ought not to deprive this argument of force in view of the tax-avoiding op-
portunities a contrary rule would offer. Here the considerations justifying the
taxation of the full value of jointly owned property to the one who had con-
tributed the funds with which it was purchased would seem to have special
relevance. 13 The absence of legal title in the decedent is of substantially less
significance in the case of an insurance policy than in that of other assets,
since the full utility of this type of property springs up with death. The values
inherent in the contract prior to death as a practical matter are infrequently
utilized and are generally considered as incidental to its primary function.
"[D] eath, coupled with the payment of premiums, is the indispensable event
giving rise to or enlarging the enjoyment of valuable property rights." 14
The Treasury, as will appear presently, shifted from the premium-pay-
ment test to the ownership test and back again, with consequent bewilder-
ment to the taxpayer. The courts contributed their share to the confusion.
Congress stood mute until 1942, perhaps because no satisfactory solution was
apparent until the Supreme Court should indicate the constitutional limita-
tions on the taxation of the complex interests which tax-conscious citizens
were creating in their policies in the hope of freeing them from a constantly
increasing tax burden.
(2) Regulations and Decisions
The 1918 regulations defined the words, "taken out by the decedent," as
referring to cases where the decedent paid the premiums either directly or in-
directly. Subsequent regulations throughout the twenties continue, with
variations, this test.15 In spite of decisional setbacks the Treasury, convinced
13. INT. REV. CODE § 811(e).
14. Bailey v. U. S., 27 F. Supp. 617, 622 (Ct. Cl. 1939).
15. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, § 10.13, pp. 512-514 (1942):
"Under the 1918 Act the regulations defined the words 'taken out by the decedent upon
his own life' as referring to cases in which the decedent 'pays the premiums, either direct-
ly or indirectly, whether or not he makes the application.' Under the 1921 Act this -inter-
pretation was changed so that the only express exemption from tax was in the situation
where the beneficiary paid the premiums : the regulations were mute as to premium pay-
ments by someone other than the insured and other than the beneficiary.
"The regulations issued under the 1924 Act first provided for an apportionment of
the proceeds where the insured paid a portion of the premiums and the beneficiary paid
the remainder. With minor changes this interpretation was carried over into Regulations
70 issued under the 1926 Act. Under a subsequent edition of Regulations 70 it was ex-
pressly stated (1) that all proceeds payable to third party beneficiaries were taxable if
the insured retained control over the policy, and (2) that all proceeds were taxable re-
gardless of control as to all decedents dying after the date of the 1924 Act, and also as
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that payment of premiums should be the vital factor if large-scale avoidance
was to be checked, stuck to its guns, until in 1929 the Supreme Court in
Chase National Bank v. United States 16 gave what looked like convincing
evidence of its preference for the incidents-of-ownership test.
17
In the Chase National Bank case the decedent had both owned the policies
and paid the premiums. The court emphasized ownership of the policies as
justifying taxation of the proceeds.
"A power in the decedent to surrender and cancel the policies, to pledge them as se-
curity for loans and the power to dispose of them and their proceeds for his own benefit
during his life which subjects them to the control of a bankruptcy court for the benefit
of his creditors .... and which may under local law applicable to the parties here, sub-
ject them in part to the payment of his debts ... is by no means the least substantial of
the legal incidents of ownership, and its termination at his death so as to free the bene-
ficiaries of the policy from the possibility of its exercise would seem to be no less a trans-
fer within the reach of the taxing power than a transfer effected in other Ways through
death." "
The Treasury surrendered in the following year (1930) to the notion
that the insurance section covered only those policies in which the decedent
retained an interest.19
to all decedents dying between the 1918 and 1924 Acts where the policy was taken out,
or the beneficiary named, after the enactment of the revenue act in force at the time of
insured's death.
"Up to 1930, therefore, incidents of ownership were not expressly required as a con-
dition of taxability. Then, on August 6, 1930, the Treasury surrendered to the idea that
the insurance section covered only policies over which the decedent retained an interest.
In the first edition of Regulations 80, appearing in 1934, wiser heads developed Article 25
as follows: 'Insurance is considered to be taken out by the decedent in all cases, whether
or not he makes the application, if he pays the premiums either directly or indirectly,
or they are paid by a person other than the beneficiary, or decedent possesses any of the
legal incidents of ownership. . .' This was the first formal edition of the regulations
which made legal incidents of ownership a test of whether policies are taken out by the
decedent, although only as one of three alternative tests. The alternative word 'or' in
the foregoing sentence from Regulations 80 naturally gave rise to the impression that
policies were taxable to the decedent's estate if any of the alternative factors existed.
This result would have been irreconcilable with Article 27 of the same regulations, which
stated that insurance receivable by beneficiaries other than the estate should be taxed
only where the insured decedent had reserved legal incidents of ownership. At this point
there was complete bewilderment for anyone who attempted to decipher the mosaic,
except that one did at least know that the insurance meaning of the words 'taken out'
did not supply even a portion of the pattern."
16. 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126, 72 L. Ed. 405 (1929).
17. Later events justified the soundness of the Treasury's views.
18. 278 U. S. 327, 335, 49 Sup. Ct. 126, 73 L. Ed. 405 (1929).
19. T. D. 4296, XI-2 Cum. BULL. 427 (1930). Where both husband and wife have
substantial independent means, the effect of the statute and regulations under either test
can be readily avoided by having the wife pay the premiums and own the policy on her
husband's life. It is difficult, if not impossible, to bring this type of transaction within
the premium-payment rule (which includes indirect payments) even in the case where
the wife's expenditures for premiums lessened the portion of family expenses which she
might otherwise have borne. This is not to argue that such insurance should be included
but merely to suggestf the discriminatory advantage. Where each pays the premiums on
the other's insurance, the case for exemption under the indirect premium payment test
is less clear. But in the overwhelming majority of cases family income or wealth is at-
tributable to a single spouse. Thus the burden of the premiums necessarily falls on the
spouse whom it is desirable to insure. To grant exemption, as the 1930 Treasury Decision
did, to the husband and income producer, when he transfers owner-hip in his policy to his
[ VOL. 2
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(3) Avoidance Devices
Insurance began to enjoy a tremendous popularity, having no relation to
the function it serves in our economy. During the thirties it* represented the
principal vehicle used by the wealthy for the removal of substantial portions
of their assets beyond the reach of the tax-gatherer.2 0 What follows is largely
of historical interest; its present significance lies in the fact that it may ex-
plain why insurance, once the recipient of preferred treatment under the tax
statutes, now finds itself subject to very real discrimination.
21
With the upping of the estate tax rates in 1932 to a point then thought of
as confiscatory, and the imposition of a tax on gifts to eliminate complete
avoidance through inter vivos transfers, the investment aspects of insurance
came to overshadow, in the minds of many, its primary purpose of protection
against the risks of premature death.
The annual premium on $100,000 worth of insurance purchased by a man
aged 50, in 1932 was $4,666. The immediate assignment of the policy, even to
a trust, incurred no gift tax as its value--4.e., its cost-was well within the
then liberal exemption of $50,000. Additional premiums after the tenth year
might incur gift tax, 22 but the rates seemed nominal compared with the
privilege of having his donee receive on his death $100,000 free of estate tax.
When contrasted with the cost of a gift of $100,000 in securities, the advan-
wife, even though he continues to pay all the premiums, is to concede tax consequences to
events that have no significance economically within the family. It is equally hard in
this type of transfer to imagine that a husband feels himself the poorer after the assign-
ment or after any subsequent premium payment than does a grantor in a Clifford trust
type of transfer.
20. A father may well hesitate to transfer income-producing securities to his children.
Human nature being what it is, the acquisitive instinct that enabled him to gain his pre-
ferred economic position makes it difficult for him to part with control, even partial, over
the family purse strings, as the cost of accomplishing substantial tax reduction. The pater
Jamilias satisfaction is peculiarly dear to the very type of mind to whom tax avoidance
has an especially strong appeal. The resultant clash created emotional conflicts which
made a multitude of tax avoiders easy prey to insurance agents armed with the 1930
Treasury Decision making incidents of ownership the decisive test. Transferring insur-
ance has myriad attractions. The recipient son or daughter feels no immediate sense of
enrichment, so long as papa lives, no new feeling of economic independence springs up,
no shifting in family wealth or control is factually recognized or likely to upset well-
ordered lives.
21. COMMITTEE ON POSTWAR TAX POLICy-TAX PROGRAM 1947, p. 148. "For pur-
poses of inclusion in the gross estate, insurance is discriminated against because, even
though the decedent retains no ownership of the insurance, it may be included in the
estate because he paid the premiums on the insurance during his lifetime. There seems
to be no sound reason why the estate tax should discriminate against property owned by
the decedent in the form of life insurance. If one person wishes to make provision for his
relatives or others in the form of life insurance and makes an outright gift of the
policies during his lifetime, retaining no incidents of ownership, 'there is no reason why
his estate should have to pay a higher tax than that of one who chose to make the same
provisions with stocks, bonds, real estate, or other, forms of property. This arbitrary
.treatment of life insurance discriminates against the salaried or professional man, and
favors those who by reason of inherited wealth or successful business ventures own other
forms of property." See also MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS AND
GiFTs, 1945-46, p. 457.
22. Gifts of future interests were excepted from the annual exclusion. 1932 Act
§ 504(b), 47 STAT. 247 (1932).
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tages were irresistible even to those who had no need for insurance protec-
tion. The variations to attain this and additional advantages were limited only
by the ingenuity of insurance agents. Single-premium policies were purchased
with bank loans, and the deductibility of the interest each March 15th, resulted
in the Government's bearing a substantial part of the cost of carrying the in-
surance. Funded insurance trusts were used in the hope of freeing from heavy
surtax the income used to pay premiums. Annuities enjoying tax-free income
tax status were purchased to restore the lost income resulting from the fund-
ing of the trusts.
23
Meanwhile Congress and the Treasury were busy with that most obvious
method of escaping the estate tax, the transfer with a retained life estate.
By 1931 this problem seemed to be well in hand,24 but here again even for the
uninsurable, "insurance" threatened to nullify the efforts of Congress. The
companies began writing what were termed combination single premium life
insurance-annuity contracts. For a lump sum of $217,000, regardless of age
and without any physical examination, a company would issue two contracts
(each studiously avoiding reference to the other), one called a life insurance
contract, in the principal sum of $200,000 payable on death to a designated
beneficiary, and the other an annuity contract, agreeing to pay the purchaser
$6,000 per year during his life.25 Physical condition and age (except for inter-
company allocation of the purchase price to the annuity and life insurance
contracts) were immaterial factors, since the risks counterbalanced each other.
Any loss which might result from premature death was exactly offset by the
profits of premature termination of the annuity obligation. The insurance
feature could be assigned to the insured's children or to a trustee and gift tax
computed upon the replacement cost not of the entire contract but of the in-
surance feature since this alone was transferred.2 6 Thus it was hoped that
$200,000 could come to his donee free of estate tax at his death. Meanwhile so
23. Prior to the adoption of Sec. 22(b) (2), INT. REv. CODE, in 1934, it was the law
that when an amount was paid for an annuity, no part of the amount received annually
was taxable as income until the cost had been restored. See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S.
404, 414, 51 Sup. Ct. 550, 75 L. Ed. 1143 (1931).
24. By a series of per curiam decisions decided March 2, 1931, following May v.
Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 50 Sup. Ct. 286, 74 L. Ed. 826 (1930), the Supreme Court held
that property transferred in trust to pay the settlor the income for his life, with remain-
ders over, need not be included in the gross estate. Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283
U. S. 783, 51 Sup. Ct. 343, 75 L. Ed. 1412 (1931), Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 783,
51 Sup. Ct. 343, 75 L. Ed. 1412 (1931), McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784, 51 Sup.
Ct. 343, 75 L. Ed. 1413 (1931). "The sequel was dramatic. Less than two days were left
until the adjournment of Congress on March 4; but March 3 sufficed for the drafting, in-
troduction, passage, and approval of an amendment to section 302 making it clear that
the transfer with reserved life estate was taxable. Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, e.
454, 46 Stat. 1516." Quoted from GiusWoL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION
168 (2d ed. 1946).
25. One agent known to the writer sold $7,509,000 of these contracts to six in-
dividuals in 1935.
26. To a donor age 40, the replacement cost of the insurance would be approximate-
ly $110,000.
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long as he lived he enjoyed the* same income from the annuity that he would
have enjoyed from the principal fund, had it been invested in securities.
2 7
(4) Governmental Reaction to Wholesale Avoidance
Congress came to the aid of the Treasury with amendments to the income
tax sections of the Code. Income from annuities to the extent of 3% of the
purchase price was treated as taxable income in the year received, beginning
with 1934, even though a portion of the principal had still to be recouped.
28
In the same year income from an irrevocable trust was made taxable to the
grantor to the extent that it was used to pay premiums on insurance on his
life,29 and finally in 1942 income tax deductions were denied for interest paid
on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase single premium life in-
surance contracts.30 But the major problem of dealing with estate tax avoid-
ance was left to the -Treasury and the courts.
Throughout the thirties the lower courts (heeding the language of the
Chase Bank case) continued to base liability on the possession at death of one
or more incidents of ownership.31 It was not until 1938 in Lang v. Conmnis-
sioner 32 that the Supreme Court again had occasion to deal with the insurance
provisions of the estate tax law and the regulations issued thereunder. This
case involved contracts most of which had been purchased -with community
property funds. While the decedent-insured had the power to change the
beneficiary the state court had determined that under state rules the contracts
were community property whose character the insured could not defeat
through change of beneficiary. As to the portion of the proceeds attributable
to the premiums paid with community property funds, only half was held
by the Supreme Coart to be subject to tax. The Court cited the regulations,
treated the section of the -Code as peculiarly subject to administrative inter-
pretation and as the pertinent regulation (1929) made liability depend on the
payment of premiums assessed the tax only on that portion of the proceeds
equal to the decedent's interest in funds used to pay the premiums. This de-
cision together with the first opinion in the famous Bailey case,33 gave the
27. It was not until 1941 that the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312
U. S. 531, 61 Sup. Ct. 646, 85 L. Ed. 996, held that the payment of the death benefits
under the combination insurance-annuity contracts did not constitute insurance proceeds
within the $40,000 exemption of 811(g), because no insurance risk was involved in the
transaction. The corollary from this was obvious. Gifts of the insurance contract, with
retention of the annuity, would fall within 811(c), as transfers with retained life es-
tates.
28. INT. REV. CODE § 22(b) (2).
29. INT. REv. CODE: § 167(a) (3). The constitutionality of this provision was sus-
tained in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 53 Sup. Ct. 761, 77 L. Ed. 1439 (1933).
30. I T. REv. CODE § 24(a) (6).
31. Robinson v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 550 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
32. 304 U. S. 264, 58 Sup. Ct. 880, 82 L. Ed. 1331 (1938).
33. In Bailey v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 617, 621 (Ct. Cl. 1939), the court deal-
ing with a situation where the insured had irrevocably assigned the policies but paid all
the premiums, said: "But, in the circumstances here present, we find nothing arbitrary or
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Treasury new hope and on January 10, 1941, Treasury Decision 5032 an-
nounced that for the future ownership of incidents would no longer be de-
terminative. Payment of premiums was once again fixed upon as the vital
element.
1942 AMENDMENTS
Congress finally revised the statutory provisions in 1942. These revisions
with minor changes 34 continue as the current law. The $40,000 exemption
was abolished.8 5 Insurance proceeds payable to an insured's executor were
included as heretofore. With respect to proceeds payable to named beneficiaries,
two alternative tests of taxability were established: (1) payment of premiums
directly or indirectly by the insured, or (2) the possession of incidents of
ownership at his death. An apportionment formula was provided in the event
that a portion only of the premiums had been paid by the insured. To avoid
any charge of changing the rules in the middle of the game, premium pay-
ments made prior to January 10, 1941 36 were not treated as having been paid
by the decedent, regardless of the facts, unless he owned incidents in the
policy after that date.
Section 811(g) (2), as formerly, applies to cases where the proceeds are
receivable by other beneficiaries. The statute, as noted above, adopted in the
alternative both- tests of taxability-ownership of incidents or payment of
premiums. There has never been any serious doubt as to the constitutionality
of reqtiring the inclusion in the taxable estate of policies in which the de-
cedent retained an interest at death. Indeed the Chase Bank case gave rise to
the common, if unfounded, belief that anything less than such an interest
capricious in the statutory requirement that' the proceeds of life-insurance policies be in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate, nor do we think it can properly be said that the re-
quirement that such proceeds be included in the gross estate deprives the beneficiary of
property without due process of law. Life insurance is inherently testamentary in character.
The payment of premiums and the insured's death are the necessary events giving rise
to the full and complete possession and enjoyment of the face amount of the policies by
the beneficiary. The acquisition of life-insurance policies on one's own life is a substitute
for testamentary disposition of property, and to allow an insured to avoid the estate tax
upon his estate by making an assignment of policies taken out by him, and upon which lie
had paid the premiums at a time when the statute required the inclusion of the proceeds of
such policies in his gross estate, would be contrary to the clear language of the statute."
34. Problems dealing with the marital deduction under the 1948 Act are treated at
length in other articles in this symposium.
35. The exemption of $40,000 was exceedingly liberal and its continued presence
from 1918 until 1942 somewhat puzzling. Congress over the years was less apathetic in
plugging income tax loopholes. The monetary value of the exemption increased pro-
portionately during the years with the enormous increase in tax rates. Yet policy con-
siderations justifying its long retention are difficult to find and are of doubtful validity.
The thought that people protect their dependents through insurance and that a tax-free
fun4 should be available to the family when the contributions of the breadwinner cease
loses force when it is remembered that Congress has always provided a liberal specific
exemption. This insurance exemption in fact discriminated in favor of those who were
insurable and also gave preferential treatment to the economically higher income class
who could afford to lay aside large sums to pay premiums. These were the very persons
who, being in the higher frackets, saved a larger percentage by virtue of the exemption.
36. Date of Treasury Decision 5032.
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might meet constitutional obstacles. Incidents of ownership include, among
others, the right to change the beneficiary, the power to borrow against or
pledge the policy for a loan, the power to cancel it and receive the cash sur-
render value. The problem under this test was and will continue to be one
of determining ownership-a problem no different from that encountered
with other types of property where nominees are sometimes used in the hope
of defeating the tax.
Prior to 1942 the cases and regulations referred to "legal" incidents.
Congress purposely omitted this term from the present subsection. The Com-
mittee report explained: "Incidents of ownership are not confined to those
possessed by decedent in a technical legal sense. For example, a power to
change the beneficiary reserved to a corporation of which decedent is sole
stockholder is an incident of ownership." 37
But a more comprehensive extension of the compass of the test is the
statute's expansion to cover "incidents owned in conjunction with any other
person." 38 In so far as this was intended to apply retroactively Congress ap-
pears to have thought of Helvering v. Helmholz 39 as dead. In that case the
Supreme Court refused to sanction an estate tax where the decedent-settlor
retained power to revest the corpus in herself with the consent of a person
having a substantial adverse interest because the trust had been created before
the first enactment of the Act imposing the tax. But the trend of the later de-
cisions, particularly United States v. Jacobs,40 would suggest that the con-
stitutional argument against retroactivity will receive short shrift from, the
court. The enlarged coverage of the statute to prevent avoidance where con-
trol is subtly retained, particularly in view of the difficulties the Treasury
faces in proving indirect payments in many cases, would seem wise Con-
gressional caution. It must not be forgotten that the taxpayer sets the stage,
plans each step in the proceedings, often years before the controversy arises,
and more often than not with studied intent to clothe the transaction in the
garments of non-taxability.
The statutory payment-of-premium test applies to indirect as well as
direct payments by the insured. Where only a portion of the cost is borne by
the insured only such portion of the proceeds as is attributable to his expendi-
ture falls within the ambit of the tax. Thus if the insured paid four $1,000
37. H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1942) ; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1942). Would the Committee have the Commissioner inchide the
proceeds, where payable to the corporation, in the decedent's estate and also have him in
valuing decedent's stock interest take into consideration its enhanced value due to the
receipt of the identical asset? This would obviously tax the same values twice. Additional
pitfalls are present if the corporation designates one other than itself as beneficiary.
Golden v. Commissioner, 113 F. 2d 590 (C. C. A. 3d 1940).
38. Under the earlier statute incidents exercisable with the consent of the beneficiary
were held not to constitute the requisite control. Walker v. United States, 83 F. 2d 103
(C. C. A. 8th 1936).
39. 296 U. S. 93, 56 Sup. Ct. 68, 80 L. Ed. 76 (1935).
40. 306 U. S. 363, 59 Sup. Ct. 551, 83 L. Ed. 763 (1939).
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premiums and the beneficiary paid eight $1,000 premiums, only one-third of
the proceeds would be included in the insured's estate.41 It is of course as-
sumed that the insured owned no incidents at his death.
How far the courts will go in finding payments to have been indirectly
made by the decedent is still a matter of speculation. Paul speaks of the phrase
as an "exhortation to those who judge that they judge with penetrating aware-
ness of economic realities and tle intangibles of the familial relationship." 
4
2
It obviously extends beyond payments through spouse or child as agent of
the insured. Even when the transfer of funds is made without any obligation
that it be expended on insurance, if it is in fact so used it will be treated as
an indirect payment by the donor-insured. The fact that he paid gift tax on
the transfer will have as little persuasive effect, standing by itself, as does the
self-serving declaration in a will of a decedent's domicile. Similarity in the
amount of the gift and the premium payment, coincidence in time, may well
be determinative without more. Conversely, the length of time between the
two transactions and the differences in amount between the gift and the pay-
ment will tend to measure the chance of a finding either way. The varying ap-
plications of the test may be expected to be in direct proportion to the in-
genuity of the taxpayers' efforts to get beyond the pale.
43
Payments by controlled corporations or trusts, by employers or by those
who in the natural course of events may confidently expect that their payments
will not go unrewarded will all receive the closest scrutiny.
-Section 811 (g) (1) provides for the inclusion in the decedent's estate of
the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies on the life
of the decedent. The Committee Report and the Regulations state that this
insurance shall be included whether the decedent or another person paid the
premiums or other consideration. No reference is made to the situation where
the decedent neither owned the policy nor paid any of the premiums, but the
41. The apportioniment principle operates differently where the insured exchanges
his policy for a monetary consideration. If the assignment has none of the elements of a
gift, as where the insured transfers his policy to a creditor in satisfaction of an obligation
equalling its cash surrender value, the statute [see 811(g) (3)] specifically precludes the
possibility of any tax should the creditor keep the policy alive. When an insured after
paying $4,000 of the premiums transfers the contract for $4,000 to another except in an
arm's-length business transaction and the latter thereafter pays $8,000 in premiums, lie
would seem, within the rules, to have paid all the premiums, i.e. $12,000. But in this
situation the statute requires consideration of the value of the policy at the time of the
transfer. Its value being its replacement cost is always in excess of the premium paid
because of the decedent's greater age at the date of transfer. Only by receiving in ex-
change the full replacement value can the decedent free the proceeds entirely from tax.
To the extent that he sells it for less he is making a gift of a fraction of the policy. This
rule is closer to economic realities than the general rule of apportionment which disregards
the dates of the respective payments. But the mathematical difficulties in its application
to each separate premium payment may justify the rough approximation to the respective
contributions of each when the exchange does not involve a payment to the decedent.
42. PAUL, SUPPLEMENT TO FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION 359 (1946).
43. The Committee Reports state: "This provision is intended to prevent avoidance
of the estate tax and should be construed in accordance with this objective." H. R. RFP.
No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 162; SEr. RP. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1942).
[ VOL. 2
1949] LIFE INSURANCE, THE FORBIDDEN FRUIT 223
clear language of the section would seem to require inclusion of the proceeds
if payable to the executor.4 4 -Certain constitutional questions may be raised
by such a construction.
Where a wife owns and pays all the premiums on a contract on her hus-
band's life and names his estate beneficiary, the proceeds on his death can
only pass to his creditors or his legatees. On the assumption that his wife re-
served the right to change the beneficiary, it seems reasonably clear that she
will be held to have made a taxable gift on his death in the face amount of the
policy. If the husband is insolvent and the proceeds are used to pay his
creditors, it may be argued- that his wife has no donative intent toward them,
but she does have a donative intent toward his estate, i.e., her satisfaction in
having her deceased husband's bills paid. Does this differ from the case where,
a living payor voluntarily discharges obligations of other members of his
immediate family? She can hardly hope to avoid the gift tax by siphoning the
fund through the husband's executor and the cases make it clear that had a
legatee been directly named beneficiary a gift tax would be incurred.4 5
The husband by hypothesis does not buy, own or control the contract.
The only connection his death bears to the transmission of the fund is the
wife's choice of that contingency as the event which should give finality to
her gift. Yet the statute would tax the proceeds as part of the husband's
estate.
The regulations enlarge the scope of the section by providing that in-
surance receivable by the executor shall include all insurance which is in fact
receivable by, or for the benefit of, the estate. It includes "insurance effected
to provide funds to meet the estate tax and any other taxes, debts or charges
which are enforceable against the estate." 46
Assume that a father purchases a policy on the life of his thriftless son,
and desiring that thQ son's creditors shall not go unpaid, creates a revocable
trust consisting of the insurance contract. The trustee is directed upon re-
ceipt of the proceeds following the son's death to discharge his obligations
and pay the balance, if any, to his widow. In this case it may well be questioned
whether the proceeds to the extent necessary to pay his creditors may be
taxed as part of the son's estate.47
In the first example it is difficult to justify the constitutionality of the
44. It will be rarer perhaps only through inadvertence, that such a designation will
be made.
45. Goodman v. Commissioner, 4 T. C. 191 (1944), aff'd., 156 F. 2d 218 (C. C. A.
2d 1946).
46. This statement is a continuation of the prior regulations but the problem under
discussion could not have arisen prior to 1942 as the former section and regulations used
the phrase "taken out by the decedent," which meant, depending on the year involved,
either paid for or owned.
47. This of course assumes a net taxable estate after all deductions and credits, in-
cluding the debts discharged by the trustee. Cf. Hooper v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A. 114
(1940).
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imposition of the tax but it is equally difficult to construe the code pro-
visions as not applicable. To hold 811 (g) (1) does not apply except when
the decedent owned or purchased the insurance, is to rob the subdivision of
all purpose, as 811(g) (2) covers cases where either of these contingencies is
present. But to include the fund in a decedent's estate, as the statute does in
the first case and the regulations do in the second, is to tax property which
the decedent during his life did not pay for, never owned or controlled and
toward which he had no relationship beyond a post mortem expectancy. This
would seem to be measuring A's tax by B's property.
4 8
While the odds are all against the taxpayer whose sole arrow to his bow
is unconstittitionality, it is submitted that the courts may well strike down the
commissioner's regulation extending the phrase "receivable by the executor"
to cases where the funds do not actually pass through his hands.40
CURRENT PROBLEIMS
(1) Contemplation of Death 50
Inclusion of insurance proceeds in the gross taxable estate does not depend
solely on 811 (g). Gifts of insurance policies are peculiarly susceptible to the
contemplation-of-death provision of the code. This provision was designed to
reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions and thus to prevent evasion
of the estate tax.5 ' Insurance has been repeatedly recognized as inherently
testamentary in character.5 2 Because the transferor's motive is the vital factor
in contemplation-of-death disputes, 53 only gifts prompted by desires associated
with continued life escape the tax.
"It is difficult to give living reasons for the gift of a life insurance policy, in that it
is not always possible to say that the insured made the gift to create a separate estate
for his wife (this is particularly true during the early years of the policy). Neither is it
possible to say that the transfer was made to save income taxes, or that it was made to
supply the wife with income, in that, as a practical matter, there is the obligation to con-
tinue the premiums and further, in many states we find that the insured could not say
that he made the transfer to get the cash values free from the claims of his creditors for
the reason that many states provide by their codes that in the instance of a life insurance
policy payable to a wife and children, the cash values are not subject to claims of creditors.
48. Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206, 52 Sup. Ct. 120, 76 L. Ed. 248 (1931).
49. Even here the courts will be faced with a difficult problem of construction. From
1919 [see Reg. 37 (1919 ed.) Art. 33], the regulation included insurance effected to
provide funds to meet the estate tax, etc. and Congress used the language of the former
statute except for the phrase "taken out" presumably intending to give it the meaning
23 years of history had attributed to it.
50. See generally, Cohn, Gifts of Life Insurance in Contemplation of Death, 26
TAxEs 156 (1948); Polisher, Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 2 VAND. L. Rsv.,
195 (1948).
51. United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 51 Sup. Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867 (1931).
52. Bailey v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 617 (Ct. Cl. 1939); Chase Nat. Bank v.
United States, 116 F. 2d 625 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
53. United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 51 Sup. Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867 (1931).
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As stated above, it is difficult to give motives primarily associated with life, as the
primary reasons for the transfer of insurance."
The case law on this problem has been less prolific than might be ex-
pected because the indirect-payment test has relieved the Treasury in large
measure from the need of calling to its aid the contemplation-of-death pro--
vision.
The Revenue Revision Bill of 1948 was passed by the House of Represen-
tatives at the first session of the 80th Congress but was not acted upon by the
Senate at either the first or the second sessions. This bill contained provisions
limiting estate taxation to proceeds of insurance policies in which decedents
owned one or more incidents at death. If passed, such provision would have
eliminated the premium-payment test. However, should it, or similar legisla-
tion, be passed at some future session it is submitted that inter vivos transfers
of insurance policies will not thereby automatically free the proceeds from
estate tax. The Treasury will simply shift its attack to the contemplation-of-
death field, heretofore largely neglected in the insurance cases only because,
unneeded.
(2) Indirect Premium Payments 55
The uncertainty in the application of the indirect payment test to par-
ticular cases has resulted in a serious limitation in the use of life insurance to
accomplish what may be regarded as socially desirable objectives. The fam-
ily of the typical American small businessman will illustrate one of the un-
54. From an address by Paul F. Millett, Esq., of the Illinois Bar before the University
of Washington School of Law, Institute on Estate Planning and the Revenue Act of
1948, September 6-8, 1948. See also Learned Hand, J., in Vanderlip v. Commissioner,
155 F. 2d 152, 154 (C. C. A. 2d 1946). "All gifts necessarily differ from bequests in that
they deprive the donor of future control over the property, and for that reason they
can never be perfect substitutes; but if the effect of the gift is substantially the same as
the gift of a remainder: that is, if the donor reserves the income to himself during his
life, it is as nearly a substitute for a bequest as it can be and still remain a gift at all....
When the property produces no income, living the donor .... it may be open to question
whether any motive can exclude it from his estate.'.. Situations may be put in which it
might be plausibly argued that motive would be relevant: for example, the donor may
wish to protect the property against the hazards of his business, or against a -possible
change in his feelings towards the donee, or he may contemplate getting married and
losing power of disposal over all his property. Whether these would affect the result,
we leave open because here the donor only desired to avoid estate taxes, and we cannot
see how that can be classed among those motives which will on any theory take a gift
out of the section. A gift differs from a bequest,--apart from the inevitable loss of con-
trol over the property-only in so far as it secures enjoyment to the donee during the
donor's life; and the donor's motives are relevant to exclude the property only so far
as 'they touch upon his enjoyment in that period. The motive to avoid taxes does not
touch that at all; a donor, interested in saving taxes, is not concerned with the donee's
enjoyment while he himself lives; he is interested in relieving his legatees from taxes after
he dies, and, not only may his legatees not be the donees, but when they are, their relief
will not concern their enjoyment of the property while he lives. Such a motive is necessarily
testamentary, and not donative."
55. See generally, Foosaner, Indirect Life Insurance Preniunis-When Paid?, 25
TAXEs 726 (1947); Hilgedag, Life Insurance Planning for Estate and Gift Taxes, in
5TH ANN. INsT. ON FED. TAXATION 25 (N. Y. U. 1947) ; Kennedy, Indirect Payment of
Life Insurance Prendiums, 21 TAXFS 475 (1943).
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happy consequences of this rule. The successful merchant or manufacturer
in the average American community has the great bulk of his wealth tied tip
in the business he has developed over the years. The problem of providing
liquid assets to meet his death cost is always a perplexing one, both to him
and to his family. There is rarely a ready market for the sale of shares in his
company, or a partial interest in his proprietorship. The vague and uncertain
criteria for fixing the value of a going concern make estimate of the taxes
to be met at his death extremely difficult and always vague. A spread of 25%
in the valuation figures of competent and impartial experts is neither sur-
prising nor unusual. A multitude of factors enters into any study of industrial
or mercantile valuation and the relevance and weight to be accorded each fac-
tor in the over-all appraisal is always a matter of judgment, with consequent
wide variations of opinion. Thus the final judgment as to value will be af-
fected by the countless sub-judgments as to the values of individual assets.
Goodwill and going concern values are at best educated guesses. Whether the
interest of a decedent is such an enterprise will be found by the commissioner
or the courts to be worth $400,000 or $600,000 or some figure within that
range is literally unpredictable.5 6 Yet the son or son-in-law who has devoted
his best years to the company and whose career centers around it, is faced
with the prospect on father's death of parting with at least a partial interest in
the business to meet estate taxes-what portion he cannot estimate-and this
uncertainty plus the knowledge that such sales are generally at sacrifice prices
may well cause him to pause. Life insurance should answer his problem. Its
essential function in our economy is to spread risks and thus avoid disastrous
loss to the unlucky few. Yet any competent advisor would feel a disturbing
sense of insecurity in recommending such a solution.
Of course the opportunity for evasion of the estate tax is present in these
56. Estate of Henry T. Sloane, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEc. SEmv. ff 44.206 (1944).
There was involved an asserted deficiency in estate tax in the approximate amount of
$3,007,000, a large portion of which was attributable to adjustments made by the Com-
missioner with respect to the values of the stocks of four corporations. The variations
between the Commissioner's determinations and the Tax Court's findings of values were
as follows:
Approximate Values Per Share
Summary description of As Determined by As Established
stock involved Commissioner by the Tax Court
Corp. A., common ...................... $ 35.00 $ 16.00
Corp. A., pfd ............................. 65.00 37.50
Corp. B., common. ....................... 51.00 1.30
Corp. B., pfd ............................. 100.00 5.00
Corp B., pr. pfd .......................... 100.00 30.00
Corp. C., capital ......................... 60.00 28.00
Corp. D., capital ......................... 6,232.00 2,600.00
The above chart was taken from A Valuation Case, in 4TH ANN. INST. ON FED,
TAxATION 381 (N. Y. U. 1946).
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cases. The father may want the insurance and to-avoid the consequences of
purchasing it himself may request the son to apply for it and pay the premiums,
making appropriate adjustment in his compensation to offset the annual cost.
But the son's personal welfare will be primarily served by an investment in
insurance. Yet he may hesitate to use this medium-so peculiarly fitted to his
needs-to accumulate the funds necessary to save the business when death
comes. The risks of a reduction of 40% or 50% in the realized proceeds
through their inclusion in his father's estate are substantial unless other eco-
nomic benefits, reascinably to be expected, are foreborne. To lessen the chance
of an adverse finding on the indirect-payment issue he will be wise to forego
salary increases or family gifts for some considerable period. Here no fixed
pattern or standard is available in determining the hidden motives which in
individual cases lie behind such acts of apparent recognition of merit or gener-
osity. Small businesses (and the small businessmen) are too individualized
to warrant drawing conclusions from similar conduct in what on the sur-
face appear to be comparable cases. There are always too many illusive
variants.
The hesitancy to protect with insurance does not operate solely to the
detriment of the legatee. The Treasury has a stake in the availability of assets
to meet the tax. Enough has been said about the uncertainty of valuation and
the opportunities for wide divergence of opinion to indicate that problems of
this sort are peculiarly- susceptible of compromise. Generally after negotiation
and a good deal of give and take, a reasonable adjustment on the valuation
issue will be made. An always important and not infrequently controlling fac-
tor in such negotiations is ability to pay. When the evidence shows that a
$600,000 valuation presents insuperable obstacles to raising the necessary
cash to meet the increased tax, but possibility exists of a bank loan or a pur-
chaser of a partial interest at an acceptable figure which would furnish cash
to meet the tax measured on a $500,000 valuation, counsel will be armed with
an argument having a stronger appeal to Treasury officials who are accus-
tomed to dealing with thard practical facts and who have other cases to turn to,
than all the theoretical formulae for the- ascertainment of values that econo-
mists can devise.
CONCLUSION
Certain only is the uncertainty developing in the operation of the tests
of ownership and payment of premiums. But uncertainty is not always a vice.
It may indeed be desirable where certainty in the rules would offer opportu-
nities for avoidance through transactions that do not effect substantially dis-
tinguishable factual results. To tax one approach to an objective and to leave
untaxed another road to the identical objective ignores substance for form.
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Theoretically ownership of incidents as the sole test is more in accord
with our basic constitutional philosophy of taxation at death. The estate tax
is a, transfer tax. Shifting of interests by death has long been the traditional
justification for its imposition. Let us take an example: A purchases Black-
acre subject to a $40,000 mortgage and thereafter deeds it by gift to B. The
mortgage calls for principal payments of $2,000 per year and A, even after the
gift, meets the annual charges and amortization payments until his death 15
years later. No one would argue that Blackacre should be included as part of
A's estate in the absence of evidence that the original transfer was a sham and
that B held the title merely as nominee or that the transfer or annual payments
were made in contemplation of death. Yet the inclusion of insurance proceeds
as part of a donor's gross taxable estate under identical circumstances is the
accepted rule. An insurance investment is thus subject to a discrimination.
Does the fact that death is the generating source of new values distinguish
insurance from other property, and thus justify the difference in treatment?
This argument would have equal validity whether the insured or another paid
for and owned the contract. Yet no one has suggested its inclusion in the latter
case. 57 Further, while insurance is the most common example of such enlarge-
ment of value by death this is not a characteristic peculiar to insurance. A
father owns lots No. 2 and 4, Main Street. By deed of gift he transfers No.
2 to his son, and on his death he devises No. 4 to same son. The death of the
father results in an enlargement of the value of lot 2 because of the additional
worth" attributable to the plottage of which it is a part. Similarly where a
minority stockholder inherits another minority interest if the combined hold-
ing gives him control, the value of the total shares as a unit will be greater
than the sum of the individual values of each share. Thus the death of A may
generate new values in the property of B, even where property other than life
insurance is involved. The payment of gift tax will free other property from
estate tax so long as the donor relinquishes his full interest, but giving away
insurance, paid for by the decedent, has no such advantageous effect.
An analysis of the nature of an insurance contract may explain the
57. "The theory of the Inheritance Tax law is that where one transmits property
to another by will, under the interstate statutes, or in contemplation of death, a tax is
imposed upon the privilege of succeeding to the ownership of the property. Where no
property or interest therein is transferred necessarily there is no tax. The insurance
companies contracted with the Bag Company, and the other beneficiaries, that upon the
payment of certain annual premiums they would pay them certain sums upon the death
of Morris Werthan, which they did. Werthan was not a party to these contracts, had not
expended so much as a dollar for this insurance, and had no interest in the policies or
their proceeds. Hence, there was no transfer from the estate of Werthan to these belle-
ficiaries. If A purchases from B a tract of land upon agreement that possession is to be
withheld until the death of C, certainly A acquires no interest in the land from C upon
his death. Or if X agrees to pay Y a certain sum upon the death of Z, upon the happening
of that event Y succeeds to no part of the estate of Z. That, in principle, is this case. It
is not unusual for parties to contract for the doing of an act or the payment of a sum
of money upon the happening of some contingency, such as birth, marriage or death."
Werthan v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 611, 613-14, 51 S. W. 2d 840, 840-41 (1932).
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reason for the different result. A gift of real estate, securities or chattels in-
volves more than the execution and delivery of documents. These transfers
create rights and obligations that call for continuous series of acts. Real es-
tate needs management and management calls for decisions. There are taxes
and mortgage interest to be paid, rents to be collected, repairs to be made,
leases to be negotiated.- The dominating influence (eithr of donor'or donee)
in these transactions will show itself in many ways and thus the bona fides of
the transfer will disclose itself in the pattern of conduct of the donee toward
the property. The same is also true of chattels. Problems come with owner-
ship of securities and there is income to spend or reinvest. Thus the need for
extending the tax to cover other property transferred prior to death has
generally been less urgent than in the case of insurance because evidence pro
and con to establish ownership rather than paper title has been available.
But with life insurance the only certain continuing relationship to the
policy is the payment of premiums. Changes of beneficiary and loans against
or pledges of the policy may occur. While such action in particular cases may
furnish telling evidence, by and large it is noncommittal in character. Within
the family group changes of beneficiary will rarely be indicative of where the
control lies; and as insurance loans are largely used only in emergency situa-
tions, the purpose of the loan may not be convincing evidence of control in
view of the normal availability of assets of individual family members for
the temporary urgent needs of other members. Thus the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing between the real and the sham transfer and the need to prevent
avoidance may well justify the different treatment. Had the philosophy of
Helvering v. Clifford 5 and the doctrine of substantial ownership appeared
15 to 20 years earlier, the need for the premium-payment test and the bewilder-
ing shifts of position in the regulations might never have arisen.
Continued payment of premiums is strong evidence of ownership. Much
of the law of resulting trusts is bottomed on the concept that he who pays
normally owns. In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary the con-
tinued payment of premiums should hive been sufficient, here, as elsewhere
in the law, to establish ownership; but the early cases looked to the paper
title and Congress finally made the reason the rule. But this should not require
arbitrary taxation or make insurance a forbidden investment. An underlying
principle stabilizing the vagueness of the indirect payment test and the un-
certainty created by the Congressional deletion of "legal" from the incidents-
of-ownership test, may yet be evolved if courts remember that the rule was
originally only the reason for the result. In finding indirect payment or posses-
sion of incidents without technical legal title, the fundamental question to be
answered is to what extent the donor really continued to dominate the property
58. 309 U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788 (1940).
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and its uses; whether some-substantial relationship connected with it disap-
peared with his death. The lines tracing payments back to the donor-insured
will often be shadowy. In determining the issue of indirect payment, as the
shadow grows fainter the greater should be the weight accorded acts of the
donee tending to establish a real inter vivos shift, along with the paper title,
of dominion over the policy. The courts should be mindful that in imposing
taxes on insurance proceeds as part of an insured's estate, when he retained
no incidents of ownership, Congress has included something not normally
within its reach. This permissible penumbra of constitutional power should be
strictly limited-by the necessity justifying it and not thought of as a further
grant of power to be liberally construed.
